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To hear Sir Roger Sheaffe, military and civil commander of Upper Canada, tell the story, his force was vastly outnumbered when the Americans attacked York on Tuesday, 27 April 1813. “We had about six hundred, including militia and dockyard men,” he wrote in one version of his official report. Elsewhere he claimed “the enemy’s troops that landed are stated to have amounted to 2,500.” Other witnesses to the battle supported Sheaffe’s account. Justice William Dummer Powell wrote of “365 [regulars,] to them may be added in numbers 250 militia and 40 art[ificers]… in all 600 men.” Thomas Ridout said there were “300 regulars and 208 militia” and John Strachan estimated the strength of the force at “about 650 or 700… regulars – 360, militia – 350.”
Historians have traditionally accepted these numbers as typified by C. P. Stacey’s treatment of the battle. Using details from Sheaffe and Powell’s reports, Stacey listed a bombardier and 12 gunners of the Royal Artillery, a company of Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles, “about a company” of Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, two companies from the 8th Regiment, between 45 and 100 native warriors and 300 militia and dockyard men.
Satisfied with these differing estimates of the strength of Sheaffe’s force, no one, it seems, has looked at the muster and pay lists of the regular and militia regiments involved. As well, even Stacey failed to take into consideration the data found in other anecdotal accounts and documents. These sources yield “new” information about the number of men who were under arms on 27 April and show that Sheaffe inaccurately assessed his resources.
The original muster and pay lists for the regular units are held by the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the former Public Record Office, at Kew, a suburb of London. There is no friendly column in any of these administrative forms with the heading “This man fought at York.” But by closely examining the forms and comparing them to official casualty lists, claims for losses and other documents (mainly in Record Group 8 at Library and Archives Canada [LAC] in Ottawa, some copies of which are held by the Archives of Ontario in Toronto), a fuller picture of the British regulars at York is attainable. For example, the detachment of Newfoundlanders included men from six different companies, the second group of the 8th comprised men from four companies and there were soldiers from two other regiments on hand who have never been represented. A conservative estimate of the actual regular force present is:
Staff 15
Royal Artillery 16
41st Foot 4
49th Foot 24
Newfoundland 104
Glengarry 62
8th Foot 203
TOTAL 428
A truer picture of the size of the militia force may be developed in the same way. Muster and pay lists and other relevant documents for the regiments are kept at LAC (Record Group 9), yet none of the modern treatments of the battle have made reference to them. A more common practice has been to denigrate the militia’s involvement as part of the overall effort to let the air out of the “militia myth” created by Loyalist-historians in the late 1800s.
The militia rolls from the war reveal that between 190 and 240 militia were stationed at the garrison at York during the fall of 1812 and into the winter. The number mustered increased in April and, according to eyewitnesses, on the day of the battle others who had not been stationed at the garrison came in from the surrounding area to join the fight. The best estimate of the militia force is:
Staff 10
1st York 159
3rd York 236
1st Durham 20
Incorporated 52
TOTAL 477
There is no simple muster and pay list for the dockyard workers but there are references to their numbers scattered in the archival records in Ottawa and the accounts book held by the City of Toronto Culture, Museum and Heritage Services. Members of the Provincial Marine were also present, although they have never been specifically counted in previous versions of the battle. Lumped together, their numbers were:
Provincial Marine 10
Dockyard 76
TOTAL 86
No definitive tally of the informal volunteers from the town (such as Donald McLean who was killed in the action) has ever been made, although the best guess list includes 10 individuals. Similarly, no one in authority listed a single native warrior by name, but it seems reasonable that about 50 of them were present.
This new depiction of Sheaffe’s force, based upon military records and a careful combing of the informal evidence from such men as Lieutenant Ely Playter and Sheriff John Beikie, shows the strength of the defensive force at about 1053. As mentioned above this is a conservative estimate, but it underlines the weight of evidence showing that Sheaffe commanded a force that was, potentially, twice as strong as he reported.
Why did Sheaffe and others not use this number? The general failed to congregate his whole force in one place that day, so no one ever saw how large it actually was. As well, no one recorded who was present and the one list that was made, the oft-quoted prisoner of war tally attached to the terms of capitulation, was erroneous. It did not refer to any of the militia men who walked away from the battle scene after the first fire fights when Sheaffe’s command and control weaknesses prevailed. The POW list also fails to mention more than 40 wounded regulars left behind by Sheaffe.
Sheaffe’s estimate of the enemy’s landing force was also inaccurate. His first estimate put it between 1900 and 3000 before he settled on 2500. Research in American archives reveals that about 1800 Americans soldiers splashed ashore on 27 April, backed up by a naval force of 13 warships (and one transport) manned by about 800 seaman (including a few marines). In the same vein, Sheaffe stated that his casualties totaled 130 (unwounded POWs excluded), but he omitted any reference to militia, artificers or Provincial Marine losses. Taking their losses into consideration and examining regimental records, a tally of 200 killed, wounded and missing is reached.
In his military classic, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “Casualty reports on either side are never accurate, seldom truthful, and in most cases deliberately falsified.” It is clear that Sir Roger Sheaffe falsified nearly all the numbers regarding the men in arms under his command. He exaggerated his weakness, overstated his enemy’s size, and understated his losses. His data was not unique, however, as the various American accounts show similar misinformation, favouring themselves, of course.
Sheaffe did not stop at miscounting men. As the next article will show, he misrepresented his artillery strength. The Americans did the same, but in the opposite direction, and effectively hoodwinked historians into overstating the effects of the capture of Little York.
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